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The history of sovereign immunity in the United States is a 
history of mistakes. 
-Susan Randa111 
[W]e must confront-yet again-the Feres doctrine .... We 
conclude that this suit falls within the doctrine's 
ever-expanding reach. We reach this conclusion only 
reluctantly, bound by circuit precedent to apply this doctrine 
to yet another case that seems far removed from its original 
purposes. 
- Costo v. United States2 
INTRODUCTION 
Through the application of the judicially created Feres doctrine, 
female service members who suffer injuries during pregnancy or the 
birthing process as a result of military medical malpractice are barred 
from seeking recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and, 
depending on the jurisdiction in which the negligent medical treatment 
* Tara Willke is an Assistant Professor at Duquesne University School of 
Law and a veteran of the United States Air Force. She would like to thank her research 
assistant, Emma Donahey, for all of her assistance. Additionally, she would like to 
thank her family and colleagues for their invaluable support and encouragement. 
1. Susan Randall, Sovereign Immunity and the Uses of History, 81 NEB. L. 
REv. 1, 2 (2002). 
2. 248 F.3d 863, 864 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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occurs, their children may also be barred from seeking recovery for the 
injuries they sustain as the result of the negligent prenatal medical care. 
The Feres doctrine spawned from the United States government's 
passage of the FTCA in 1946, which was intended to be a broad waiver 
of the government's sovereign immunity.3 Pursuant to the FTCA, the 
government could be held liable for torts committed by its employees. 4 
The FTCA contains certain exceptions to this general waiver but never 
did, and currently does not, explicitly bar service members from 
bringing suit for injuries they sustain during their military service that 
do not fall within one of the enumerated exceptions. 5 
In 1950, however, the United States Supreme Court, in Feres v. 
United States, 6 held that service members were barred from bringing 
claims pursuant to the FTCA if the injury to the service member 
occurred "incident to service. "7 The "incident to service" test is not 
tied to any one of the enumerated exceptions in the FTCA and is, thus, 
an exception created by the Court. Federal courts have tried to apply 
this test and have struggled to determine when an injury occurs 
"incident to service," and injuries have been found to occur incident to 
service simply if the service member was on active duty at the time of 
the injury, regardless of whether the injury resulted from the service 
member's military duties.8 
Thus, in cases involving claims brought by female service 
members for injuries suffered during their pregnancies or births as the 
result of military medical malpractice, courts have, with very little 
discussion or rationalization, held that the injuries occurred "incident to 
service" and are barred by the Feres doctrine. 9 The child's claim may 
also be barred under the theory that it derived from the mother's injury 
and is barred because the mother's injury is barred. 
3. See infra Part IT. 
4. See infra Part ll. 
5. See infra Part IT. 
6. 340 u.s. 135 (1950). 
7. ld. at 146. 
8. For example, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that "[t)he 
dispositive inquiry [is] whether the service-member stand[s] in the type of relationship 
to the military at the time of his or her injury that the occurrences causing the injury 
arose out of activity incident to military service." Purcell v. United States, 656 F.3d 
463, 466 (7th Cir. 2011). Under this test, the Seventh Circuit bas held that when a 
service member commits suicide on base during non-working hours, the injury arises 
out of an activity that was incident to service. ld. at 466-67. 
9. See infra Part III. 
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In an earlier essay, I address the "incident to service" test as it 
applies to the pre-birth cases. 10 After reviewing the history of women in 
the military and the unique treatment the military affords pregnant 
service members, in that essay I argue that pregnancy and any injuries 
sustained incident thereto cannot be considered occurring "incident to 
service" and should not be barred by the Feres doctrine. 11 In reviewing 
the pre-birth injury claims brought by female service members, I was 
surprised to fmd that their claims were being dismissed rather 
summarily, with very little, if any, discussion regarding how the claims 
undermined the rationales the Court outlined as underpinning the Feres 
doctrine.12 If the woman was in the military when the injury occurred 
during pregnancy, her injury was barred, end of discussion. 
In an effort to understand the force behind the perfunctory nature 
of the dismissals, my research led me to the doctrine of federal 
sovereign immunity. The Feres doctrine is, after al1 , grounded in the 
concept of sovereign immunity. The current application of the doctrine 
of federal sovereign immunity is that the government cannot be subject 
to suit unless it consents, regardless of whether the lawsuit implicates 
government policy decisions. In other words, immunity is available just 
because the government is a sovereign. The Supreme Court subscribes 
to this view. Whether the government should be able to claim unbridled 
immunity is, however, far from settled, but there are sound reasons for 
allowing the government to claim immunity for policy decisions that 
affect the public at large. 13 
In examining the pre-birth injury cases brought by female se.rvice 
members and the current application of the Feres doctrine, I have 
reached the conclusion that even though the Court outlined broad policy 
rationales supporting the existence of the doctrine, in application of the 
doctrine to pre-birth cases, the doctrine mirrors the current mistaken 
application of sovereign immunity in general and provides a virtual 
blanket form of immunity. 14 Stated differently, in order to invoke the 
10. Tara Willke, Military Mothers and Claims Under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act for Injuries that Occur Pre-Birth, 91 NoTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 160 (2016) . 
11. Id. at 165- 68. 
12. /d. at 167-68. 
13. E.g., Harold J . Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity , 45 VAND. 
L. REv. 1529, 1534-41 (1992); see Gregory C. Sisk, The Continuing Drift of Federal 
Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 517, 522-25 (2008). 
14. The cases that form the basis of this essay are only one example of 
instances where the doctrine has been applied without any meaningful review of 
whether the policy rationales underlying the Peres doctrine are actually implicated. A 
complete review of cases outside of the pre-birth context is beyond the scope of this 
essay, but it is an issue that is, nonetheless, ripe for review and discussion. 
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protection of the doctrine in FTCA cases brought by female service 
members for injuries sustained pre-birth, the government is not 
required to explain how any of the policy rationales enunciated by the 
Court for the doctrine are implicated by the female service member's 
claim. This is a mistake that is based on the mistaken belief that 
sovereign immunity has no boundaries or limits. 
Thus, in Part I, I examine the doctrine of federal sovereign 
immunity and outline the competing theories regarding the existence of 
and purposes for the doctrine at the federal level. The federal 
government has operated under the assumption that unless it waives its 
immunity, it cannot be subject to suit. Part II provides a targeted 
overview of the FfCA and the Feres doctrine, focusing on the policy 
rationales enunciated by the Supreme Court for the creation of the 
doctrine. The pre-birth injury cases are just one example of how the 
expansive view of sovereign immunity has been applied to members of 
the military, and these cases are discussed in Part III. 
Finally, in Part IV, I argue that Congress must reassert itself in 
this issue because, ultimately, whether the FTCA bars claims by female 
service members for injuries sustained pre-birth as the result of medical 
malpractice and the broader issue of whether the Feres doctrine should 
be used to bar similar claims is a policy determination that must be 
addressed by Congress. If Congress continues to allow the status quo to 
prevail, then courts addressing claims brought by service members 
under the FTCA should acknowledge that the concept of sovereign 
immunity embodied in the applica_tion of the Feres doctrine has been 
taken too far and conduct a meaningful review of the claims to 
determine if they undermine the rationales enunciated by the Court for 
the creation of the doctrine. In the cases involving injuries to service 
women and their children pre-birth, this will lead to the conclusion that 
these are not the types of claims that should be barred by the Feres 
doctrine. 
I. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
The concept of sovereign immunity is commonly traced to the 
British monarchy, where the King was not to be called into court 
without his consent. 15 Under the British theory of sovereign immunity, 
British subjects could only seek a petition of right to address claims 
15. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 205 (1882). See generally Randall, 
supra note 1, at 14-16; Marc L. Roark, Retelling English Sovereignty, 4 BRIT. J. AM. 
LEGAL STUD. 81 , 83-84 (2015). 
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against the monarchy. 16 Under its current application in this country, 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity provides the federal government 
with immunity from lawsuits unless the government consents to being 
sued. Even though there is almost widespread agreement that the 
Constitution does not explicitly grant the federal government immunity 
from lawsuits, 17 there is disagreement regarding whether the doctrine 
should exist in a democratic republic. 18 Proponents of the doctrine 
argue that it exists without an explicit gram in the Constitution. 19 
Opponents argue that the doctrine conflicts with democracy and has no 
role in a government where the people are the sovereign. 20 Others fmd 
that there are reasons for the doctrine's existence, but there is also 
acknowledgement that, as currently applied, the doctrine's application 
has been taken far beyond what is necessary to honor the doctrine's 
logical purposes. 21 
There is a valid argument that " [ s ]overeign immunity is a 
judge-made doctrine in its very origins. "22 In the Supreme Court's early 
jurisprudence regarding the existence of the doctrine in the new 
republic, as early as 1821, the Court acknowledged in dicta that the 
doctrine existed, 23 but it also acknowledged that "the principle has 
16. Lee, 106 U.S. at 205. 
17. E.g. , Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, 
Imnumity, and Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. lNT'L L. REv. 521, 523 (2003); 
see also Fred 0. Smith, Jr., Awakening the People's Giant: Sovereign Immunity and 
the Constitution's Republican Commitment, 80 FORDHAM L. REv. 1941, 1943-50 
(2012) (discussing the Guarantee Clause and its interplay with the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity). But see Paul F. Figley & Jay Tidmarsb, The Appropriations Power and 
Sovereign Immunity , 107 MICH . L. REv. 1207, 1264-67 (2009) (discussing the 
Appropriations Clause as a source of immunity for claims for money damages). 
18. E.g. , Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 
1425, 1435 (1987) (discussing who was to be the "ultimate unlimited sovereign" and 
ftnding that early Americans believed that "[t]rue sovereignty resided in the People 
themselves"). 
19. E.g. , Alfred Hill, In Defense of Our LAw of Sovereign lmnumity, 42 B.C. 
L. REv. 485, 488- 89 (2001). 
20. E.g. , Erwin Cbermerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. 
REv. 1201, 1201-03 (2001) . 
21. E.g., Jackson, supra note 17, at 522-27. 
22. Katherine Florey, Sovereign Immunity's Penumbras: Common LAw, 
"Accident, n and Policy in the Development of Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 43 WAKE 
FOREST L. REv . 765, 767 (2008); see also Sarah L. Briton, Three-Dimensional 
Sovereign Immunity, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 237, 242 (2014). 
23. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 264, 411 - 12 (1821) ("The 
universally received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted against 
the United States .... "); accord United States v. M'Lemore, 45 U.S. (1 How.) 286, 
288 (1846) ("[T]he government is not liable to be sued, except with its own consent, 
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never been discussed or the reasons for it given. "24 More recently, in 
Alden v. Maine, 25 which involved state sovereign immunity, the Court 
reviewed the doctrine's history, stating that "the doctrine that a 
sovereign could not be sued without its consent was universal in the 
States when the Constitution was drafted and ratified. "26 According to 
the Court, ratification of the Constitution did not alter that 
understanding. 27 Thus, the doctrine was rooted in the belief that all 
governments were immune from suit and the only way for the 
sovereign to be subject to suit was if it consented thereto. 28 
Others who support the existence of the doctrine have articulated 
theories other than the theory articulated by the Court to support the 
existence of the doctrine. One theory focuses on the government's need 
to insulate itself from suit for the policy decisions that affect the public 
at large "because open-ended and unconstrained access to the courts by 
those who object to governmental policies or actions could undermine 
effective governance by the people through an electoral majority. "29 
Thus, the idea is that the policy decisions that the government makes 
for the public at large should not be reviewed in court. 30 Instead, the 
desirability of such decisions should be left to the electorate and the 
political process.31 Under this justification for sovereign immunity, 
there is a recognition that not all government actions are subject to 
immunity and government actions that are not tied to policy 
determinations should not be protected by the doctrine. 32 Along those 
same lines, a test for determining when the government is able to 
invoke the protection of the doctrine has been proposed. 33 It has two 
criteria: 
given by law.") . See generally Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on the Doctrine of Federal 
Sovereign Immunity, 58 OKLA. L. REv. 439, 443-44 (2005). 
24. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207 (1882). 
25. 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
26. /d. at 715-16. 
27. See id. ("Tbe generation tbat designed and adopted our federal system 
considered immunity from private suits central to sovereign dignity ."). 
28. Hill, supra note 19, at 489 ("[I]mmunity is an inberent attribute of 
sovereignty, without regard to tbe form of government prevailing within tbe borders of 
tbe particular sovereign."). 
29. Sisk, supra note 13, at 529-30; accord Krent, supra note 13, at 1532 
("The doctrine of sovereign immunity permits Congress to determine when to rely on 
tbe political process to safeguard majoritarian policy."). 
30. Sisk, supra note 13, at 529-30. 
31. Krent, supra note 13, at 1532. 
32. /d. at 1532-33; see also Sisk, supra note 13, at 529-30. 
33. Corey Brettschneider & David McNamee, Sovereign and State: A 
Democratic Theory of Sovereign Immunity , 93 TEX. L. REv. 1229, 1235-36 (2015). 
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First, the state must act "for the people" within a framework 
that respects the rights of citizens and in which its powers are 
limited so as to meet this need. Second, the state must act "by 
the people" by deriving its power from the consent of the 
governed through their representatives. 34 
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Both criteria must be met for the goverrunent to claim it is immune 
from liability for its actions.35 
Other justifications for the doctrine's existence are tied to the 
public treasury. One theory is that the doctrine protects the public 
treasury from excessive judgments. 36 Even under this theory, the 
government should not be allowed to claim that the doctrine 
automatically insulates it from liability. 37 Another similar theory 
focuses on the relationship between the branches of the government and 
the need for the courts to protect themselves from appearing weak. 38 
The theory is that because the Constitution grants Congress the ability 
to make appropriations, even if a court enters a judgment against the 
United States, the court has no way to force the government to make 
the payment. 39 Thus, "[a]sserting the constitutional provenance of the 
sovereign immunity doctrine in a sense empowered the Court more 
fully to control what remedies it would make available. ".w Professor 
Vicki Jackson, who has articulated this theory, writes, "[T]o the extent 
sovereign immunity can be understood as a form of early judicial 
efforts to protect and secure judicial independence . . . its scope should 
be reconsidered and narrowed (if the doctrine itself is not abolished). "41 
Opponents of the doctrine argue that it does not exist in a form of 
government where sovereignty lies with the people. 42 Thus, in a 
democratic republic, the concept of sovereign immunity is 
34. !d. at 1235. 
35. /d. at 1235- 36. 
36. Sisk, supra note 13, at 543. 
37. /d. at 562 ("It is quite another thing to allow lhe canon of strict 
construction to devolve into a methodology by which the government wins 
automatically whenever plausible arguments can be made for alternative interpretations 
of a statutory provision that sets forth standards, limitations, exceptions, or procedural 
rules for claims against the government already authorized by an express waiver."). 
38. See Jackson, supra note 17, at 574-75. 
39. ld. at 574. 
40. ld. at 604-05. 
41. ld. at 607. 
42. Amar, supra note 18, at 1466 (no immunity for constitutional violations); 
Chermerinsky. supra note 20, at 1203 (the doctrine "conflicts with too many basic 
constitutional principles to survive"); Randall, supra note 1, at 3 ("LT]he federal 
government . . . enjoys no constitutional immunity in Article ill cases."). 
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"inconsistent" with the Constitution because it places the government 
above the people. 43 Professor Susan Randall argues that this "mistake 
has thwarted the administration of justice in this country over the 
course of more than two centuries, depriving many claimants against 
the United States . . . protection of our law. "44 Examining similar 
evidence used by the Court to find that the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity survived ratification, Professor Randall agrees with the Court 
that prior to ratification of the Constitution there was a general 
understanding regarding the concept of sovereign immunity and the 
ability of a sovereign to be immune from suit unless it consented, but 
she argues that "the Founders understood ratification of the 
Constitution to provide that consent. "45 
Thus, the exact reaches of federal sovereign immunity, if it exists 
at all , are far from settled, and there are a number of reasonable, sound 
arguments questioning the existence and reach of the doctrine. The 
Court has, however, taken the position that the federal government 
cannot be subject to suit unless it consents, and this is the assumption 
under which Congress has operated. The next section addresses one of 
the government's particular waivers of its immunity-the Federal Tort 
Claims Act-and the Court's determination that this waiver was not 
intended to apply to members of the military for injuries they sustained 
"incident to service." 
II. THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT AND THE FERES DOCTRINE 
Because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the United States 
government was not subject to liability for torts caused by its 
employees until the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)46 in 
1946. The FTCA was Title IV of the Legislative Reorganization Act. 47 
The purpose for the Legislative Reorganization Act was "[t]o provide 
for increased efficiency in the legislative branch of the Government. "48 
43. Randall, supra note 1, at 15. 
44. ld. at 6. 
45. !d. at 30. 
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012). 
47 . Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 601 , 60 Stat. 812, 
842. 
48. ld. The passage of the FTCA was, according to some accounts, spurred 
by a B-24 bomber crash into the Empire State Building. Joe Richman, The Day a 
Bomber Hit the Empire Stare Building, NPR (July 28, 2008), http://www.npr.org/ 
templates/story/story.php?storyld=92987873. The Texas City Disaster of 1947, where 
it was estimated that it was possible that up to six hundred people died after a French 
ship carrying ammonium nitrate exploded, may have also helped trigger the passage of 
the FTCA. Edward G. Babdi, A Look aJ the Feres Doctrine as It Applies to Medical 
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Prior to the passage of the FTCA, in order for a private citizen to seek 
relief for a tort caused by a government employee, the citizen had to 
fmd a congressional sponsor to shepherd the claim through both houses 
of Congress for ultimate approval by the President.49 Even though the 
actual procedure was well established by the time the FTCA was 
passed, the process was "remarkably inefficient" and time consuming. 50 
The FTCA was considered a broad waiver of the United States' 
sovereign immunity. 51 Pursuant to the FTCA, the United States became 
liable "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private 
individual under like circumstances"52 "for money darnages"53 for 
damages to property and personal injury caused by "any employee of 
the govenunent. "54 When the FTCA was passed, it contained twelve 
exceptions. 55 None of those twelve exceptions unambiguously barred 
members of the military from bringing claims under the FfCA. There 
are currently thirteen enumerated exceptions, including one for "[a]ny 
claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval 
forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war. "56 The other two 
Malpractice Lawsuits: Challenging the Notion Tho.t Suing the Government Will Result in 
a Breakdown of Military Discipline, ARMY LAW., Nov. 2010, at 56, 57. 
49. See generally Walter Gellhom & Louis Lauer, Congressional Settlement 
ojTort Claims Against the United Stares , 55 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1955). 
50. PAUL FIGLEY, A G UIDE TO THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 6-7 (2012). 
51. E.g., Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 866 (9th Cir. 2001). 
52. 28 u.s.c. § 2674 (2012). 
53. /d. § 1346(b)(l). 
54. /d. 
55. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 601, § 421 , 60 Stat. 
812, 845-46. 
56. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (2012). The other enumerated exceptions are: 
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the 
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, 
whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the 
exercise or perfonnance or the failure to exercise or perfonn a discretionary 
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the 
Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused. 
(b) Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission 
of letters or postal matter. 
(c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or 
customs duty, or the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property 
by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer, 
except that the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title 
apply to any claim based on injury or loss of goods, merchandise, or other 
property, while in the possession of any officer of customs or excise or any 
other law enforcement officer, if-
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exceptions that may be read as applying to members of the military are 
those for claims arising in a foreign country and for the exercise of a 
discretionary function. 57 As noted by one court shortly after the passage 
of the FfCA, the legislative history regarding the enumerated 
exceptions was "singularly barren" regarding the purpose behind each 
one of the listed exceptions. 58 
(1) the property was seized for the purpose of forfeiture under any 
provision of Federal law providing for the forfeiture of property other 
than as a sentence· imposed upon conviction of a criminal offense; 
(2) the interest of the claimant was not forfeited; 
(3) the interest of the claimant was not remitted or mitigated (if the 
property was subject to forfeiture); and 
( 4) the claimant was not convicted of a crime for which the interest of 
the claimant in the property was subject to forfeiture under a Federal 
criminal forfeiture law . . [sic] 
(d) Any claim for which a remedy is provided by chapter 309 or 311 of title 
46 relating to claims or suits in admiralty against the United States. 
(e) Any claim arising out of an act or omission of any employee of the 
Government in administering the provisions of sections 1- 31 of Title 50, 
Appendix. 
(f) Any claim for damages caused by the imposition or establishment of a 
quarantine by the United States. 
[(g) Repealed. Sept. 26, 1950, cb. 1049, § 13(5), 64 Stat. 1043.] 
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false 
arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, 
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights: Provided, 
That, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement 
officers of the United States Government, the provisions of this chapter and 
section 1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the 
date of the enactment of this proviso, out of assault, battery, false 
imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. For 
the purpose of this subsection, "investigative or law enforcement officer" 
means any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute 
searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law. 
(i) Any claim for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasury or 
by the regulation of the monetary system. 
(k) Any claim arising in a foreign country. 
(I) Any claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority. 
(m) Any claim arising from the activities of the Panama Canal Company. 
(n) Any claim arising from the activities of a Federal land bank, a Federal 
intermediate credit bank, or a bank for cooperatives. 
Id. § 2680(a)-(i), (k)-(n). 
57. /d. § 2680(a), (k). 
58. Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 767, 769 (9th Cir. 1948). 
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In 1949, the United States Supreme Court, in Brooks v. United 
States,59 first addressed whether recovery under the FTCA was 
available for members of the military for instances not covered by the 
exceptions in the statute-although the plain language of the FTCA 
appeared to allow such claims unless one of the enumerated exceptions 
applied. In Brooks, two brothers, who also happened to be members of 
the military, were hit by a vehicle driven by a goverrunent employee 
while the brothers were on furlough. 60 One of the brothers died, and the 
other was injured. 61 When claims by the surviving brother and the 
estate of the deceased brother were brought under the FTCA, the 
goverrunent sought to have them dismissed because the brothers were 
on active duty at the time of the accident. 62 The district court denied the 
motion, but the appeals court reversed. 63 
In a relatively short opinion, the Court affrrmed, fmding that the 
statute provided district courts with jurisdiction over "any claim" and 
stated that "it would be absurd to believe that Congress did not have the 
servicemen in mind in 1946, when this statute was passed. "64 The 
Court then discussed the versions of the tort claims bills that were 
introduced before the FTCA was passed, and it found that of the 
eighteen introduced between 1925 and 1935, sixteen contained 
exceptions for claims brought by members of the military. 65 When the 
version that ultimately became the law was introduced, the exception 
for claims brought by members of the military had been omitted. 66 
Because the accident at issue had "nothing to do with the [brothers'] 
army careers," their claims were viable under the FTCA. 67 The Court 
did, however, state that "[w]ere the accident incident to the [brothers'] 
service, a wholly different case would [have been] presented. "68 
In 1950, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to decide that 
"wholly different case" in Feres v. United States.69 Feres addressed 
59. 337 U.S . 49 (1949). 
60. /d. at 50. "Leave" or "furlough" are the military terms used to describe 
approved vacation or "leave" time. The fact that the brothers were on furlough means 
that they were not just off duty, but that they were also on approved leave. 
61. /d. 
62. /d. 
63. /d. at 50-51. 
64. /d. at 51. The Court further stated, regarding the fact that Congress had 
servicemen in mind, that "[t]he overseas and combatant activities exceptions make this 
plain." /d. 
65. /d. 
66. /d. at 51-52. 
67. !d. at 52. 
68. ld. 
69. 340 u.s. 135 (1950). 
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three cases that were factually similar: in each of the cases a member of 
the armed forces suffered injuries by government employees while on 
active duty and not while on leave, and two of the three cases 
concerned negligent medical care. 70 The Court found that the fact that 
the plaintiffs in Feres were on active duty and not leave at the time of 
the injuries was a "vital distinction., because in Brooks the plaintiffs 
were on leave and not under "orders or duty and on no military 
mission. "71 Pursuant to the Court's holding in Feres, the FTCA was not 
a viable remedy "for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out 
of or are in the course of activity incident to service. "72 
The Court found unpersuasive that the statute already contained 
enumerated exceptions (none of which were applicable to the facts 
before it) and the fmal version of the FfCA did not contain an 
exception for members of the service not injured during war, as did 
sixteen of the prior versions. 73 The Court found that members of the 
military already had a "comprehensive system of relief' and that "[t]he 
primary purpose of the Act was to extend a remedy to those who had 
been without," so the statute could not be read as creating yet another 
avenue for members of the service to recover for their injuries.74 
Furthennore, reasoned the Court, members of the military had never 
been allowed to sue the government, and allowing such lawsuits would 
create causes of action Congress had not contemplated. 75 In considering 
the broad language used in the Act, which suggested that there was not 
a limit to the types of claims allowed if certain exceptions did not 
apply, the Court found that the section in which the language was found 
was merely jurisdictional and it remained for the courts to determine 
which claims would be allowed. 76 Additionally, the Court held that 
there existed a "distinctly federal" relationship between the government 
and those in the armed forces, such that the relationship was governed 
by federal, not state, law. 77 
70. /d. at 137-38. 
71. /d. at 146. 
72. /d. 
73. !d. at 138-39. 
74. /d. at 140. The Court's fmding was seemingly consistent with other 
courts' interpretations of other statutes waiving the federal government's immunity. See 
geMralty Paul Figley, In Defense ofFeres: An Unfairly Maligned Opinion, 60 AM. U. 
L. REv. 393, 446 (2010). 
75. Feres, 340 U.S. at 141-42. 
76. /d. at 140-41 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (Supp. lli 1950)). 
77. !d. at 143-44 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 
305 (1947)). 
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Three of the reasons justifying the Court's holding in Feres 
became known as the "F eres rationales :m One rationale focused on the 
relationship between the federal govenunent and members of the 
military. 79 The reasoning behind this rationale was that because those in 
the military are federal employees, federal law, and not state tort law, 
should govern claims brought by these federal employees. 80 Another 
rationale focused on the existing availability of benefits for those in the 
military. 81 If members of the military already had a system of benefits 
that provided them with recovery, then there was no need for them to 
bring claims under the FTCA. The final rationale articulated by the 
Court in Feres focused on the fact that members of the military were 
not allowed to sue the government prior to the enactment of the FTCA, 
so Congress did not envision creating a new cause of action for 
members of the military when it passed the FTCA. 82 
Four years after the Court's enunciation of the rationales used to 
support the decision in F eres. the Court seemingly introduced another 
rationale: one grounded in "military discipline. "83 The Court provided 
little elaboration regarding the basis for this rationale, but it stated that 
the rationale was grounded in "[t]he peculiar and special relationship of 
the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such suits 
on discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits under 
the [FTCA] were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts 
committed in the course of military duty. "84 The "military discipline" 
rationale led to the rejection of the earlier rationale that was announced 
in Feres: the belief that the FTCA did not create causes of action for 
members of the military.85 Pursuant to the new "military discipline" 
rationale, courts were to ask whether the "suit require[d] the civilian 
court to second-guess military decisions. "86 At one point, the Supreme 
Court seemed to emphasize and prioritize this rationale over the other 
78. United States v. Johnson , 481 U.S. 681, 688-91 (1987). 
79. Id. at 689. 
80. /d. 
81. /d. at 689-90. 
82. Feres, 340 U.S. at 141- 42. 
83. United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954). 
84. /d. 
85. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 694-95 (Scalia, J. dissenting) ("In any event, [the 
Court] subsequently recognized [its] error [in formulating this earlier rationale] and 
rejected (it as a justification] .") . 
86. United Stares v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 57 (1985). 
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remaining two, 87 but it ultimately reiterated that the doctrine was 
underpinned by all three of the rationales. 88 
Other than articulating the three rationales, the Court has not 
provided any other guidance as to when an injury occurs "incident to 
service." The late Justice Scalia took all three of these rationales to task 
in his dissent in United States v. Johnson .89 He argued that none of the 
stated rationales "justifie[d the Court's] failure to apply the FTCA as 
written" and that "Feres was wrongly decided and heartily deserve(d] 
the 'widespread, almost universal criticism' it has received. "90 
Given the criticism of the rationales and the difficulty in applying 
them, circuit courts began creating their own factors to consider when 
determining whether the Feres doctrine applied to bar suits. 91 For 
instance, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considers "1) where the 
negligent act occurred[,] 2) the duty status of the plaintiff when the 
negligent act occurred[,] 3) the benefits accruing to the plaintiff because 
of his status as a service member[,] and 4) the nature of the plaintiff's 
activities at the time the negligent act occurred. "92 None of the factors 
is dispositive, and the court will consider "the totality of the 
circumstances. "93 The Ninth Circuit noted that it has "reached the 
unhappy conclusion that the cases applying the Feres doctrine are 
irreconcilable," so when determining whether the doctrine applies, it 
looks to cases with analogous fact patterns to determine if the doctrine 
should be applied. 94 
The Court has extended application of the doctrine to claims 
brought by third parties when the third party's claim derived from an 
injury that a member of the military sustained incident to service. 95 This 
87. /d. ("[T)he situs of the [tort) is not nearly as important as whether the suit 
requires the civilian court to second-guess military decisions .. .. "). 
88. Johnson , 481 U.S. at 688-91. 
89. 481 U.S. 681 (1987); id. at 692- 703 (Scalia, J ., dissenting). 
90. /d. at 700 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting In re "Agent Orange" Product 
Liability Litigation, 580 Fed. Supp. 1242, 1246 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)). 
91. E.g. , Casto v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 2001); accord 
Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029, 1043 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[T)he lower courts have found 
the rationales other than discipline extremely difficult to apply in a coherent 
manner .. .. "). 
92. Costo, 248 F .3d at 867 (citations omitted); accord Wake v. United States, 
89 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 1996); Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1013 (5th Cir. 
1980) (considering the military member's duty status, where the injury occurred, and 
what the service member was doing at the time the injury occurred); see also Pierce v. 
United States , 813 F.2d 349, 353 (11th Cir. 1987) (adopting the three-part Parker test). 
93 . Casto , 248 F .3d at 867 (citations omitted). 
94. ld. 
95. Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 674 (1977). 
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has become known as the "genesis" test. 96 Pursuant to this test, the 
inquiry is whether the claim originated in an injury that occurred to a 
member of the military incident to that member's service. 97 This test 
has taken on a life of its own and has been applied to a number of 
situations outside of the "garden-variety indemnification suit" from 
which it originated. 98 For instance, it has been applied to bar claims 
brought by the children and spouses of members of the military for 
birth defects the children allegedly suffered as the result of inoculations 
their fathers received during the Persian Gulf War. 99 Additionally, as is 
discussed in more detail below, it has been applied to claims brought by 
the children of service women. 
Ill. THE PRE-BIRTH INJURY CASES 
Until the 1970s, women who were in the United States military 
and who chose to have children could be subject to discharge based on 
their status as mothers. 100 Today, however, women who choose the 
military as a career path are no longer automatically subject to 
discharge because they are also mothers. 101 In the early cases involving 
injuries sustained by pregnant female service members and their 
children, the service member herself sought recovery. 102 The Feres 
doctrine was, however, used to bar the claims brought by those female 
service members, and courts did so primarily based on an application of 
the three Feres rationales. For instance, in Atkinson v. United States, 103 
a female service member brought a claim under the FTCA, arguing that 
the military's failure to adequately diagnose and treat her symptoms, 
96. Ortiz v. United States ex ret. Evans Army Cmty. Hosp., 786 F.3d 817, 
824 (lOth Cir. 2015) . 
97 . ld. 
98. ld. at 823-24. 
99. Minns v. United States , 155 F.3d 445 , 446, 451 (4th Cir. 1998). See 
generally Ortiz , 786 F.3d at 824 n.5 (citing other circuit courts that have applied the 
genesis test outside of the indenmity context). 
100. In 1951, President Truman signed Executive Order 10240, which 
essentially allowed female service members to be discharged for having children or 
assuming motherly duties. Exec. Order No. 10240, 3 C.P.R. 749 (1949-53). 
101. The policy allowing for the discharge of pregnant women was challenged, 
and some branches of the service started to abandon the policy by granting pregnant 
soldiers waivers, but the official pronouncement on the policy' s constitutionality was 
not until 1976 by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Crawford v. Cushman, 531 
F.2d 1114, 1116 (2d Cir. 1976). 
102. Irvin v. United States, 845 F.2d 126, 127 (6th Cir. 1988); Del Rio v. 
United Stares, 833 F.2d 282, 284 (11th Cir. 1987); Atkinson v. United States, 825 F.2d 
202, 203 (9th Cir. 1987). 
103. 825 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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which were consistent with pre-eclampsia, resulted in the death of her 
child, who was stillborn. 104 The government settled the claims for the 
child's injuries, 105 but the female service member sought damages for 
the physical and emotional injuries she allegedly suffered due to the 
government's negligent care. 106 
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the court initially reversed the 
district court's dismissal of the suit under the Feres doctrine. 107 In so 
doing, the court relied on the application of the third Feres rationale 
and ultimately found that "[t]he care provided a pregnant woman hardly 
can be considered to be distinctively military in character" and that the 
service woman's "injuries ha[d] nothing to do with her army career 
'except in the sense that all human events depend upon what has 
already transpired. "'108 The Ninth Circuit then withdrew that opinion, 
however, due to the United States Supreme Court's decision in United 
States v. Johnson, which clarified that all three of the Feres rationales 
must be considered to determine if the doctrine bars the suit. The Ninth 
Circuit ultimately held that the third Feres rationale did not support 
dismissal of the female service member's claim, but it held, without 
elaboration, that application of the other two rationales supported 
dismissal. 109 
In Irvin v. United States, uo the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
dismissed a claim by a female service member and her child for 
negligent prenatal care after her child died shortly after it was born.u1 
The mother claimed that the military was negligent in "prescribing her 
contraindicated medication," failing to correctly diagnose and treat her 
pregnancy condition, and providing less than the acceptable standards 
of care. 112 As was alleged in the complaint, these negligent acts led to 
the baby's death four days after she was born. 113 The court quickly 
104. Id. at 203. 
105. As noted by the concurrence, "[t]bat the government did not invoke this 
rule against Baby Atkinson [was] a tribute to its humanity but [did] little to mitigate the 
harshness of the general rule." !d. at 207 (Noonan, J., concurring). 
106. Id. at 203 n.l. 
107. Atkinson v. United States, 804 F.2d 561, 561 (9th Cir. 1986), withdrawn, 
825 F .2d 202, 203 (9th Cir. 1987). 
108. Id. at 565 (quoting Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 52 (1949)). 
109. Atkinson, 825 F.2d at 206. 
110. 845 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1988). 
111. Id. at 130-31. 
112. Id. at 127. 
113. Id. 
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found that the mother's claim was barred under the Feres doctrine 
because she was on active duty at the time she suffered the injuries. 114 
In Del Rio v. United States, 115 a female service member argued 
that her pregnancy and the treatment that she received as a result was 
not incident to her service in the military. 116 Without providing any 
meaningful discussion, the court disagreed: because the mother's 
"active duty military status" allowed her to receive medical care at the 
base medical facility, that "medical treatment . . . was incident to her 
military service." 117 It was able to quickly dispense with the second 
factor as well, fmding that she was entitled to care under the military's 
no-fault compensation system. 118 Finally, regarding the third rationale, 
the court found that because the mother's job in the Navy was as a 
hospital corpsman, it "place[ d] the discipline, supervision and control 
of her working group at issue. "u9 No meaningful, in-depth review was 
conducted, and that is the approach that continues today. 
For example, in the most recent case involving a child's claim 
under the FTCA for pre-birth injuries, the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reiterated that in determining whether the Feres doctrine 
applied, the primary inquiry was "whether the injury was ' incident to 
service. '" 120 The court admitted that the language "incident-to-service" 
was "neither self-defining nor readily discernible from the language of 
Feres or Johnson. " 121 Nevertheless, it found that the test applies very 
broadly and "encompasses, at a minimum, all injuries suffered by 
military personnel that are even remotely related to the individual's 
status as a member of the military" and that "[p]ractically any suit that 
implicates the military's judgments and decisions runs the risk of 
colliding with Feres. "122 Thus, the court found that the three Feres 
rationales "effectively merged . . . with the incident to service test," 
and it would apply that test as it was first articulated in Feres. 123 
114. /d. at 130. 
115. 833 F.2d 282 (11th Cir. 1987). 




120. Oniz v. United States ex rei. Evans Anny Cmty. Hosp., 786 F.3d 817, 
821 - 22 ( lOth Cir. 2015). 
121. !d. at 820-21. 
122. !d. at 821 (quoting Pringle v. United States, 208 F.3d 1220, 1223-24 
(lOth Cir. 2003)). 
123. Id. at 822-23 (quoting Ricks v. Nickels , 295 F .3d 1124, 1130 (lOth Cir. 
2002)). 
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As a result of the courts' unwillingness to fully consider whether 
the claim should be barred, at the end of the 1980s it was clear that a 
female service member's claims for injuries she sustained during 
pregnancy were going to be barred by the Feres doctrine. Whether her 
child would be able to state a claim was (and still is) wholly dependent 
on where the injury occurred and the approach taken by the federal 
court in that jurisdiction. Regarding the claims brought by the service 
women's children, three approaches have been taken. The first 
approach involves an application of the Feres rationales, and in the ftrst 
cases addressing this issue, courts turned to those rationales to 
determine if the child's claim should be barred under an application of 
the rationales, which led the courts to reach inconsistent results. 124 The 
Fourth and Sixth Circuits use what has been termed the 
"treatment-focused" approach, which focuses on whether the treatment 
was directed at the child or the mother. 125 If the "sole purpose" of the 
treatment was to benefit the child, the Feres doctrine is found to not be 
applicable and will not bar the child's claim. 126 
In Ortiz v. United States ex rei. Evans Army Community 
Hospital, 127 the Tenth Circuit rejected the "treatment-focused" approach 
and applied the "injury-focused" approach and held that a child's claim 
for injuries sustained pre-birth was barred under the FTCA because her 
mother, a captain in the Air Force, suffered an injury during the 
124. Compare Scales v. United States , 685 F.2d 970, 973-74 (5th Cir. 1982), 
and Irvin v. United States, 845 F.2d 126, 130-31 (6th Cir. 1988) (applying the Peres 
rationales and finding that the children's claims were barred), with Del Rio, 833 F.2d at 
287-88 (applying the Feres rationales and finding that the child's claim was not 
barred). 
125. Brown v. United States, 462 F.3d 609, 616 (6th Cir. 2006); Romero v. 
United States , 954 F.2d 223, 226 (4th Cir. 1992). In order to reconcile its holding with 
its earlier, seemingly contrary holding in Irvin, in Brown the Sixth Circuit held that it 
was "not convinced that the end result of (the] analysis require(d] slavish adherence to 
Irvin," because the facts were distinguishable and because the opinion in Irvin "rest[ed] 
on shaky ground." Brown, 462 F.3d at 614. According to the court in Brown, Irvin 
rested on "shaky ground" because the language it relied on was, allegedly, dictum from 
the Fifth Circuit's decision in Scales. /d. at 614 (citations omitted). 
126. E.g., Romero, 954 F.2d at 225. Other approaches have been proposed. 
For instance, in a case where the child's injuries were allegedly caused by the military's 
failure to follow the pregnant service member's pregnancy plan, one judge suggested 
that the Feres doctrine should not be applied in situations where the military failed to 
follow its own policies and regulations. Ritchie v. United States, 733 F.3d 871, 879 
(9th Cir. 2013) (Nelson, J., concurring), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2135 (2014). Another 
judicial approach that has been suggested is to focus on the military's conduct toward 
the service member, and if that conduct toward the service member would be barred by 
the Feres doctrine, so too would the claim brought by the third party. Ortiz, 786 F.3d 
at 834 (Ebel, J. , concurring). 
127. 786 F.3d 817 (lOth Cir. 2015). 
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delivery, even though the mother was not bringing a claim for any 
injury she herself sustained. 128 The "injury-focused" approach "asks 
flrst whether there was an incident-to-service injury to the service 
member." 129 If that question is answered in the affirmative, then the 
inquiry focuses on "whether the injury to the third party was derivative 
of that injury. "130 Both questions have to be answered in the affirmative 
for the Feres doctrine to apply. 131 The plaintiffs in Ortiz are currently 
seeking review by the Supreme Court, 132 but prior to the Tenth 
Circuit's opinion in Ortiz, the Supreme Court had been asked to 
address the issue regarding the application of the F eres doctrine to 
cases involving pregnant service members and their children on four 
occasions and denied certiorari each time. 133 
IV. RIGHTING THE WRONGS 
Even though the Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he Feres 
doctrine cannot be reduced to a few bright-line rules," 134 that is exactly 
what has happened to claims brought by service women for injuries 
sustained during their pregnancies. 135 Thus, under the mistaken 
perception that sovereign immunity has no limits, tethers, or 
boundaries, the Feres doctrine has been applied to bar the claims 
brought by female service members injured as a result of military 
medical malpractice without any meaningful inquiry as to whether the 
rationales underpinning the existence of the doctrine are implicated by 
the lawsuit. 
As a result, potentially viable claims, like the claim at issue in 
Atkinson, have been dismissed, and the courts have engaged in 
128. Id. at 828. 
129. /d. at 825. The court found that the "treatment-focused" approach could 
lead to strange results because it could be difficult to ascertain whether the treatment 
was to benefit the mother, the child, or both. Jd. at 830. 
130. /d. at 825. 
131. ld. 
132. Ortiz , 786 F.3d 817, appeal ckJcketed, No. 15-488 (U.S. Oct. 13, 2015). 
133. Ritchie v. United States, 733 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2013) , cert. denied, 134 
S. Ct. 2135 (2014); Irvin v. United States, 845 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 
488 U.S . 975 (1988); Atkinson v. United States , 825 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 485 U.S. 987 (1988); Scales v. United States , 685 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 460 U.S . 1082 (1983). 
134. Shearer v. United States, 473 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) . 
135. As noted by Judge Ferguson in Costo v. United States, "the ' incident to 
service' test appears to have given way to an ' incidental to service' inquiry, further 
distorting Congress's original language in the FTCA." 248 F.3d 863, 870 n.l (9th Cir. 
2001) (Ferguson, J., dissenting). 
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numerous forms of legal gymnastics to determine if a child's claim for 
injuries sustained pre-birth should be barred just because the child's 
mother happens to be a member of the military. As discussed above, 
this has led to unfairness and inconsistency in the way the doctrine has 
been applied to the claims brought by the children of service women. It 
has, however, also led to unfairness between other military 
constituents. For example, as the Feres doctrine is currently applied in 
the pre-birth cases, only a female service woman's claim is barred. Put 
more simply, a male service member whose wife is not in the military 
may bring a claim under the FTCA for damages sustained if his wife or 
their child is injured during the pregnancy and, likewise, so may his 
wife and child. 136 
On a broader scale, it has led to unfairness between civilians and 
members of the military because "[t]he doctrine effectively declares 
that members of the United States military are not equal citizens, as 
their rights against their govermnent are less than the rights of their 
fellow Americans. "137 For example, even though the same rationales 
underpinning the doctrine may be implicated in claims for medical 
malpractice by civilians, civilians are allowed to bring those claims. 
Thus, the unbridled application of sovereign immunity through the 
Feres doctrine raises constitutional arguments that are beyond the scope 
of this essay but that are nevertheless present and cannot be ignored. 
The F eres doctrine applies to a wider variety of cases than just 
those involving claims for injuries that occur during pregnancy, and 
whether members of the military should be barred from bringing claims 
under the FTCA is a far-reaching policy determination that should be 
left for Congress. Congress is aware of the unfairness that is currently 
caused by the application of the Feres doctrine, particularly in the area 
of medical malpractice. In the 1980s and early 1990s, it attempted to 
rectify the unfairness caused by the doctrine' s application in cases 
involving medical malpractice, but all attempts failed. 138 
136. Reilly v. United States, 665 F. Supp. 976, 978-79 (D.R.I. 1987) 
(involving a claim under the FTCA brought by a male member of the service, his wife, 
who was not in the service, and their infant daughter, who suffered extreme injuries 
prior to her birth), ajJ'd in part, 863 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1988). 
137. Costo , 248 F.3d at 870 (Ferguson, J. , dissenting). 
138. H.R. 3407, 102d Cong. (1991-92) (introduced and reported to the 
Committee on the Judiciary); H.R. 1054, lOOth Cong. (1987- 88) (passed the House 
with a vote of 312 to 61); H.R. 3174, 99th Cong. (1985- 86) (passed the House with a 
vote of317 to 90); H.R. 1943, 98th Cong. (1983- 84). 
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In 2009, another attempt was made: the Carmelo Rodriquez 
Military Medical Accountability . Act. 139 The proposed legislation was 
triggered by a tragedy in which the diagnosis of a young service 
member's malignant melanoma was never fully explained to him or 
treated by military doctors, which ultimately caused his very untimely 
death. 140 The legislation would have allowed a service member to bring 
a claim "arising out of a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the 
performance of medical, dental, or related health care functions." 141 
Despite the bill's good intentions, it did not survive contact with its 
many enemies. It received a favorable recommendation from the House 
Committee on the Judiciary, but opponents of the bill were concerned 
that it would "not make any significant contribution towards improving 
the quality of military medicine and [would] undermine military morale 
and effectiveness. " 142 As a result, nothing was done. Congress should, 
however, reassert itself in this area. Its failure to do so has led to a 
regime where the courts have been left to implement a policy that has 
never been articulated by Congress and has led to unfairness between 
members of the military and between members of the military and the 
general public. That cannot be what Congress intended when passing 
the FTCA. 
In the event that Congress maintains the status quo-which is, 
unfortunately, a likely scenario-courts should acknowledge that the 
current application of the Peres doctrine parrots the Court's 
jurisprudence regarding the vast reach of federal sovereign immunity: 
that the federal government is immune from suit regardless of whether 
the lawsuit implicates government policy decisions. In acknowledging 
this fact, courts should conduct a meaningful inquiry regarding whether 
the lawsuit actually runs afoul of any of the policy rationales relied on 
to invoke the protection of the Peres doctrine. 143 In cases involving 
139. H.R. 1478, lllth Cong. § 268I(a) (2009); S. 1347, lllth Cong. 
§ 2681(a) (2009). 
140. See generally Melissa Feldmeier, Comment, At War with the Feres 
Doctrine: The Carmela Rodriquez Military Medical Accountability Act of 2009, 60 
CATH. U. L. REv. 145, 164-65 n.l41 (2010); Kenneth R. Wiltberger, Note, The 
Carmela Rodriquez Military Medical Accountability Act of 2009: An Opportunity to 
Overturn the Feres Doctrine as It Applies to Military Medical Malpractice , 8 AVE 
MARJA L. REv. 473, 473-74 (2010). 
141. H.R. 1478; S. 1347. 
142. H.R. Rep. No. 111-466, at 20 (2010). 
143. A number of scholars have called for the demise of the Feres doctrine and 
a number of alternatives have been suggested in cases not specifically involving injuries 
that involve pregnant women and their children. E.g., Patrick J. Austin, Incident to 
Service: Analysis of the Feres Doctrine and Its Overly Broad Application to Service 
Members Injured IJy Negligent Acts Beyond the Battlefield, 14 APPALACHIAN J.L. 1, 18 
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pre-birth injuries, the four-part test used in some jurisdictions does not 
go far enough in ensuring that the doctrine is applied fairly. 
Instead, in these types of cases, courts should find that injuries 
suffered by service women pre-birth cannot be determined to occur 
"incident to servic~. " As discussed in my earlier essay, at the time the 
Court formulated the "incident to service" test, women were subject to 
discharge for any reason, and pregnancy has never been considered part 
of the military's mission. 144 To the contrary, the concept of motherhood 
has always been recognized by the military as something specific to 
women. If a woman becomes pregnant on active duty, she may seek a 
voluntary separation because of the pregnancy. 145 Upon confirmation of 
pregnancy, the military may impose restrictions on a pregnant service 
member's ability to change her duty station during the duration of the 
pregnancy and for a short time thereafter. 146 Likewise, pregnant service 
(2014); Bahdi, supra note 48, at 67; Peggy L . Miller, An Ounce of Immunity Prevents 
a Pound of Lawsuils: Medical Malpractice and Military Mothers, 70 U. DET. MERCY 
L. REv. 327, 328 (1993) (arguing that in determining whether immunity exists, one 
should focus on the actor , not the victim); Thomas M . Gallagher, Note, 
Servicemembers' RighJs Under the Feres Doctrine: Rethinking 'Incident to Service' 
Analysis, 33 VILL. L. REv. 175, 199-203 (1988) (arguing that, in determining whether 
an injury occurred "incident to service,"' courts should focus on whether military 
decisions will be questioned in the lawsuit and whether the lawsuit will have a negative 
impact on military discipline); Geoffrey G. Leder, Note, The Feres Doctrine, Negligent 
Prenatal Care, and Injuries to the Children of Pregnant Military Servicewomen: Brown 
v. United States, 76. U. CIN. L. REv. 1043, 1065-66 (2008) (arguing that, in 
determining whether the child's claims are barred, the courts should focus only on the 
Feres rationales and not ask whether the injury derived from an injury to the service 
woman). 
144. Willke, supra note lO, at 166. 
145. E.g., U.S. DEP'T OF AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 36-3208 para. 
3.17 (2004) ("Women may fmd pregnancy and the expectation of motherhood 
incompatible with continued military service [and,) [i]f so, they may ask for 
separation."). 
146. E.g., U.S. DEP'T OF AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 36-2110 para. 
2.39 (2009); see U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, ARMY REGULATION 614-30 para. 5-3 (2015). 
Commanders have also had to take seemingly drastic measures regarding pregnancy to 
ensure unit readiness. For instance, on November 4, 2009, the commanding officer in 
Iraq instituted a policy that provided for the court martial of soldiers, both male and 
female , if a female soldier became pregnant while serving under his command. See 
Sarah Netter & Louis Martinez, Senators Demand General Rescind Order on Pregnant 
Soldiers, ABC NEWS (Dec. 22, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/general-backs-off-
threat-court-martial-pregnant-soldiers/story?id=9399604. Major General Cucolo, the 
officer who instituted the policy, stated tbat the reason be instituted the policy was 
because the loss of the female soldiers, who would have to return stateside after 
becoming pregnant, would leave the unit weaker. See General: No Court Martial for 
Pregnant Soldiers, NBCNEws.coM (Dec. 22, 2009), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/ 
34524436/ns/us _ news-military/t/ general-no-court-martial-pregnant-soldiers/. He also 
stated that while some soldiers had been reprimanded for violating the policy, none had 
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members may have their regular work duties altered during their 
pregnancy. 147 
Furthermore, courts are well equipped to address this issue when a 
similar suit is brought by a civilian, so it should not be automatically 
presupposed that just because a plaintiff is a member of the armed 
forces, the court will have to delve into sensitive military matters based 
on that fact alone. 148 In short, an acknowledgement that the reaches of 
federal sovereign immunity have been stretched to unreasonable limits 
wi11 help the courts addressing these cases reach the conclusion that 
pregnancy and any injuries incident thereto do not occur "incident to 
service" and are not barred by the Feres doctrine. If the mother's claim 
is not barred, then her child's claim will not be barred, so the issue 
regarding whether the child has a claim will be addressed through a 
finding that the mother's claim is not barred. 
CONCLUSION 
The mistaken belief that federal sovereign immunity provides the 
government with blanket immunity from suit unless it consents has 
crept into the application of the Feres doctrine, at least as that doctrine 
has been applied to the claims brought by service women for injuries 
sustained pre-birth. This has created a far-reaching policy under which 
.these service members may be barred from bringing claims under the 
FTCA if the injury occurred when they were in the military, regardless 
of the tenuous connection between the injury and the service member's 
military duties. The pre-birth injury cases also illustrate how far this 
policy has been taken and its harsh ramifications. Congress simply 
could not have intended to create this kind of unfairness when it passed 
the FTCA, and it should address the matter and clearly specify its 
intent. Alternatively, it is time for courts to acknowledge that the 
been court martialed and he did not foresee any being court martialed for violating the 
policy. Id. 
147. E.g. , U.S. DEP'T OF AIR FORCE, AJR FORCE INSTRUCTION 10-203 
para. 3.5 (2014); U.S. DEP'TOF ARMY, ARMY REGULATION 40-501 para. 7-9 (2011). 
148. Krent, supra note 13, at 1532- 33 ("Government actions that are 
situation-specific, such as physician malpractice, rarely stem from previously set 
policy" and "[i]mmunizing such acts from tort suits may not force the government to 
internalize the costs of its actions, which, in turn, may lead to inefficient governance in 
the future. "); Sisk, supra note 13, at 562 ("It is quite another thing to allow the canon 
of strict construction to devolve into a methodology by which the government wins 
automatically whenever plausible arguments can be made for alternative interpretations 
of a statutory provision that sets forth standards, limitations, exceptions, or procedural 
rules for claims against the government already authorized by an express waiver.") . 
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doctrine of sovereign immunity, as it is applied today, rests on very 
unsettled ground and that there are solid reasons for reining it back in. 
